Whole Life Sentences and the Erosion of Human Dignity

Whole Life Orders represent the most severe form of punishment available in the British criminal justice system. These sentences, which ensure that an individual will never be released from prison, no matter their age at sentencing or any subsequent changes they make, are a stark deviation from the principles of human rights, rehabilitation, and the core principles of human dignity. The European Court of Human Rights and various legal precedents underscore the inhumanity of such sentences, asserting that they breach fundamental human rights.

As of 30 June 2023, there were 65 individuals serving whole life sentences in the UK, including notorious offenders such as Rosemary West and Lucy Letby.

Section 321 of the Sentencing Act 2020 lays down the regime for making of such Orders, it prescribes that:

(1) Where a court passes a life sentence, it must make an order under this section.

(2) The order must be a minimum term order unless the court is required to make a whole life order under subsection (3).

(3) The order must be a whole life order if—

(a) the case is within subsection (3A) or (3B), and

(b) the court is of the opinion that, because of the seriousness of—

(i) the offence, or

(ii) the combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, it should not make a minimum term order.

In the landmark case of Vinter v UK [2013], the ECHR ruled that whole life sentences without the possibility of review are a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits inhuman and degrading treatment. The court held that for a life sentence to be compatible with human rights, there must be a mechanism for reviewing the sentence after 25 years. In Hutchinson v UK [2017], the ECtHR restated the principles in Vinter, noting that life imprisonment with no possibility for release still constituted a breach of Article 3, however, the Court noted that the UK regime did not breach this right. On this, Marcus Roberts of Melbourne Law School has stated:

“…we can see that a striking feature of this case is how easily the Grand Chamber appeared to resile from its position in Vinter, decided less than four years before. The Court did not admit that its approach to the relevant Convention rights had changed. Rather, it suggested that UK law had changed — or had, at least, been clarified — after McLoughlin. This is doubtful […] Further, whatever the legal position, there had been no change in practice in the release of life prisoners since Vinter (that is, none had been released in the intervening period).”

The psychological impact of whole life orders cannot be overstated. As noted by Cunha et al.:

“The prison environment can be inherently damaging to mental health due to the consequent disconnection from family, society, and social support, loss of autonomy, diminished meaning and purpose of life, fear of victimization, increased boredom, the unpredictability of surroundings, overcrowding and punitiveness, experiencing and witnessing violence, negative staff-prisoner interaction, and other aversive experiences”

The notion of never being released can only be considered a form of psychological torment. Whole life prisoners will likely spend two to three times longer in prison than the age they were when they committed their offences. To state legally that an individual is beyond all rehabilitation, that there is nothing they can do to turn their life around, is to strip them of their humanity. This stance negates the potential for personal growth and change, fundamental aspects of human dignity and morality. It also negates the sheer fact of biological and psychological development, humans are a constantly evolving and developing species, with the human brain only reaching biological maturity between 25 and 30, and psychological maturity often not being reached by many for several years after.

Internationally, other legal systems recognise the importance of maintaining hope for rehabilitation. In the German Lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe case, the court ruled that the state must not treat offenders merely as objects of crime prevention to the detriment of their constitutionally protected right to social worth. The German court emphasised that respect for human dignity and the rule of law necessitates a humane enforcement of life imprisonment. This includes providing prisoners with a “concrete and realistically attainable chance” to regain their freedom at some later point.

The court also stressed that rehabilitation is constitutionally required in any community that values human dignity. After atoning for their crimes, offenders must be given the opportunity to re-enter society. This perspective aligns with the ECHR’s ruling in Vinter v UK and highlights the importance of balancing justice with humanity.

The current approach in the UK, as outlined in the Sentencing Act 2020, necessitates urgent reform. Despite their rarity, the law mandating whole life orders without consideration for the potential for rehabilitation fails to align with international human rights standards and the evolving understanding of justice.

One of the critical reforms needed is the implementation of a review mechanism for whole life sentences. Such a mechanism would not automatically guarantee release but would provide prisoners with the hope and incentive to engage in rehabilitation programmes. It would also align the UK’s practices with the requirements of the ECHR and the principles upheld by other jurisdictions.

Furthermore, there needs to be a broader societal discussion on the purpose of imprisonment. Is it solely for punishment, or should it also aim to rehabilitate and reintegrate individuals into society? The answer to this question has profound implications for how we view and treat those who have committed serious offences.

As society progresses, the justice system must reflect an understanding that even those who have committed the most heinous crimes are capable of change. Denying the possibility of redemption not only undermines the essence of human dignity but also contradicts the foundational values of a humane and just society. Whilst the actions committed by those subject to such Orders are beyond thought, we do not raise society up by subjecting those to inhuman treatment.

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